Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1981

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the First Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk . Supreme Court Case Files Collection.
Box 90. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

.

~~-~~~ ·
~~~~~
...ye.t;~~~ • .t n .. ~ ~ ~> .;r

12-l

"J,t..~~ •J:'S.

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 13, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 81-611
GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO.

v.
SUPERIOR COURT for
the COUNTY OF NORFOLK (Mass.)
SUMMARY:

State/Civil

Timely

This appeal challenges a Massachusetts statute

barring the public and the press from portions of criminal trials involving rape or other sexual abuse of a minor.
FACTS:

A Massachusetts statute requires the exclusion of

the general public (including the press) from the court room at
a criminal trial "for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime
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involving sex, where a minor under .eighteen

year:fi~e

person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have
been committed."

-

The exclusion is mandatory; no trial court

discretion is involved.

~

Appt's reporters were barred from the courtroom during the
trial of a man charged with the forcible rape of three

--

minors.V~~

The prosecutor told the trial judge prior to trial that the ~~
victims did

not ~n ~lnclusion

of the press provided that

no~

photographs, interviews, or articles containing personal information were permitted.

The criminal defendant and appt both
---...
~objected to the exclusion, but the trial court, finding the ~)z~ ~
language of the statute to be mandatory, denied the objections
and closed the trial. The defendant was acquitted of the
charges before the first appeal of the press exclusion ruling;
he is no longer involved in the case.

-

In its first hearing of the case (Globe I), The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's decision, but held that the statute only required exclusion from
that portion of the trial in which a minor victim was actually

-------~---------------------------------------------testifying.
The court stated that the law gave the trial court
~

discretion to close other portions of the trial.

On

appeal,

this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448

u.s.

555 (1980).

HOLDING BELOW:

On

remand, the Sup Jud Ct again affirmed.

The court noted that there was no opinion for the Court in
Richmond Newspapers, but that all of the opinions of the Jus-

-

3 -

tices in the majority admitted that closure might be required
in some circumstances.

In particular, Justice Stewart's opin-

ion mentioned that "the sensibilities of a youthful prosecution
witness, for example, might justify similar exclusion in a
criminal trial for rape

•• " 445

u.s.

~:tt 600 n.5.

There

has been a considerable history of exclusion of the public and
in some cases the press from trials involving rape, especially
when the victim is a minor.

Most appellate courts have upheld

'

such exclusions particularly when they only involve closure
\

during the testimony of the victim.

There are five significant

state interests involved here: 1) encouraging minors to report

------- - ...

sexual offenses, 2) protecting minor victims from humiliation
and embarrassment, 3) enhancing credibility of juvenile witnesses by avoiding confusion, fright and embarrassment, 4) promoting the administration of justice, and 5) preserving evidence and obtaining convictions.

Contrary to appt's conten-

tion, closure need not be evaluated case-by-case.

The closure

hearing itself would have severe psychological costs and even
the possibility of press coverage might deter victims from reporting crimes or agreeing to testify.
The court noted that this statute is part of the state's
'
' '
y toward mmors.
'
- "It
tra d'1t1onal
an d accepte d sol1c1tousness

I(

would be anomalous indeed if a State Legislature could protect
juvenile offenders by closed hearings but was deemed to lack
the power to protect juvenile victims of crime."

Given the

narrow scope of the statute as interpreted, the interests of
the state outweigh those of the press and its readership.

Jus-

- 4 -

tice Wilkins, concurring, would require specific findings by
the trial court before closure but apparently would not require
a hearing.
CONTENTIONS:

Appt raises the same contentions raised be-

low and discussed by the state court.

Its first argument is

that criminal trials must be fully open to the press and public
unless closure in a particular case is the least drastic means
of accomplishing an overriding governmental interest.

Appt

does not argue ~at closure is never permitted, only that it
must be justifierd by the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

Richmond Newspapers prohibits closure "[a]bsent

an overriding interest articulated in findings." 448
581.

u.s.

lt

To justify infringement on First Amendment rights, gov-

ernmental action must be closely tailored to the state's interest and must avoid any unneccessary infringement.

The inter-

ests identified by the Sup Jud Court do not warrant closure of
all of the testimony of all minor victinms in all cases.

The

Massachusetts statute is unique in that it requires closure
rather than merely giving the trial court discretion to close
the trial.

Even Richmond Newspapers involved only the discre-

tionary exclusion of the press and public by a trial judge.
The paternalistic state interests are insufficient to support
the blanket rule.

The statute is unnecessarily broad because

it does not provide for a hearing before the trial is closed.
Every decision rendered since Richmond Newspapers has required
such a hearing. The hearing need not be elaborate or cumbersome
and may afford the victim sufficient protection.

The state

UJk.e-j t-p' L] ~
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tions of the trial are to be closed.

The appt's second argument is that closure violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

The Sup

Jud Ct did not discuss this issue because it found that appt
could not raise the defendant's claim.

However, the defendant

himself opposed the exclusion of the public and the press.

The

defendant's rights are "inextricably bound up" with those of
appt, so appt should be allowed to raise those rights.
The state's motion to dismiss or affirm reiterates the
points made by the state court. First, it argues that the appt
does not have "1.standing~I to raise the defendant's Sixth Amendment
claims.

Even if the defendant himself were a party to this

case, the claims would be moot because of the acquittal.

The ~

next contends that the statute, as modified by the state
court's interpretation, accomodates appts First Amend interests
-~·

and does not raise the problems encountered in Richmond Newspapers.

Only a small portion of trials must be closed.

All of

the opinions in Richmond Newspapers acknowledged that closure
might be justified in some cases.
der the overbreadth doctrine.

The statute is not void un-

That doctrine does not apply

here because the statute does not block any expression; it only
temporarily blocks one source of information.
to transcripts of all testimony.

Appt had

access )~

If the doctrine did apply,

the statute would still be valid because it implements overriding state concerns in the least restrictive manner.

Appt ig-

nores one important interest: in order to encourage victims to

- 6 -

come forward, the state must be allowed to assure
vance that they will be absolutely protected from
Under appt's proposal, there is no certainty of privacy.

The

hearing itself could be stressful and damaging to the vict1 •
DISCUSSION:

The Massachusetts court's determination tha
ll

\

appt cannot raise the Sixth Amendment claim of the defendant ·
seems correct.

....

This might be a much different case if the de-

fendant himself had pursued his objections to the exclusion of
the public and press, but he did not.

Gannett Co. v.

DePasquale is still good authority for the proposition that the
press cannot raise the Sixth Amend claims of criminal defendan ts •
Th

s not insubstantial.

The sev-

eral Richmond Newspapers opinions seem to contemplate exceptions to the rule of press and public inclusion; exclusion of
the press and public from the courtroom while a minor victim of
rape is testifying seems a likely candidate for such an exception.

The issue here is whether closure can be mandated by the

-

legislature for the general
class of cases or must be decided
....
\

case-by-case after a hearing or at least
ings.

af~ecific

find-

There is dicta in the plurality opinion in Richmond

Newspapers that at least specific articulated findings are required.

The state claims several strong interests in favor of

exclusion, one of which supports closure without a hearing or
findings more specific than that the crime involves a sexual
offense against a minor:

the state argues that if it is to

encourage minor victims to report sexual offenses, it must

- 7 -

guarantee protection from public

e~posure

in advance and not

merely leave the matter to the discretion of the trial court.
There is also weight to the argument that if the First Amendment permits closure of the trials of juvenile offenders it
must also permit protection of

juvenile victims from having to

testify in public and before the press.

Appt has pointed to

several state cases where courts have required hearings before
allowing closure.

See, e.g., State v. Sheppard,

, 42 Conn.L.J. No. 23 at 6 (1980)

A.2d ____

(evidentiary hearing required

before press can be excluded from portion of trial in which
minor rape victim testified): State v. Sinclair, 274 S.E. 2d
411 (S.C. 1981) {press exclusion during testimony of 9-year-old
victim of sex crime permissible "after balancing the interests
of all parties.")

These cases do not involve mandatory closure

statutes, however, and I do not they present a sufficient conflict to require oral argument.
I recommend that the Court affirm.
There is a response.
11/05/81
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To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Globe Newspaper:

NO. 81-611

I think that you can go either way in this case.
is

clear--and

protecting

not

contested--that

juvenile victims will

can

victim's

exclude

testimony

the

state's

interest

in

in some cases outweigh the

public's first amendment rights.
State

the

It

The question is whether the

public

and

in all cases

press

from

a

juvenile

in the absence of

specific

factfindings by the trial judge.

You have written several concurring and dissenting
opinions

that

bear

upon

this

issue.

Indeed,

you

are

the

progenitor of the first amendment right of public/press access
to trials, prisons, etc.

The difficulty with this approach--

as you recognize--is to develop some middle ground where the
right of access does not turn into a constitutional version of
the Freedom of Information Act.

In

Saxbe

v.

Washington

Post

Co.,

u.s.

417

843

(1974), you argued that the press--as agent of the public--had

...

.-

z.

a

first

amendment

right

to newsgathering at

a

prison.

You

argued that the FBI's absolute ban on press interviews with
prisoners could not meet the "heavy burden of justification"
appropriate
However,

when

you

a

first

would

amendment

not

have

interest

required

determination by prison officials:

"While

the

Bureau

First

Amendment

requires

the

is
a

I

restricted.
case-by-case

agree
to

••.

that

abandon

its

absolute ban against press intereviews, I do not believe that
it compels the adoption of a policy of ad hoc balancing of the
competing interest involved in each request for an interview •
..• Thus, the Bureau could meet its obligation under the First
Amendment
penal

and

protect

administration

its
by

legitimate

rules

drawn

concern
to

serve

for

effective

both purposes

without undertaking to make an individual evaluation of every
intereview

request."

You

suggested

that

time,

manner restrictions would certainly be appropriate.

place

and

So would

some limit on the number of interviews any single inmate might
give.

On the basis of your position in Saxbe you could go
either way depending on how you characterize the regulation
here.

If you characterize the regulation as an "absolute ban"

on open courtrooms during

juvenile

testimony--regardless

of

whether the juvenile victim would permit the press to stay-then you reverse.

If you characterize the regulation as the

sort of rule that reasonably accommodates competing interests-

j.

It is

-such as you urged the FBI to adopt--then you affirm.

not hard to characterize this rule in non-absolute terms: GLl t
~

only bars the public during the victim's testimony; GD.i t only

~\\

applies to juvenile victims in sex crimes;dD it does not block
eventual release of a transcript @. t does not bar the press
from directly interviewing the victim at some point.

In Gannett Co. v.

DePasquale,

u.s.

443

368

(1978),

you concurred, again urging a first amendment approach.

You

suggested that

trial

judges could order closure of pretrial

hearings

only

after

but

careful

weighing

of

competing

considerations and after providing the press an opportunity to
object to closure.

Your concurrence can be read as requiring

a close, case by case consideration by the trial judge--rather
than permitting

any general

prohibition

such

as

existed

in

this case.

I tend to think that just as juvenile trials

m~y

be

shut without a case by case determination, so, too, the state
--..J

may

shut

a

juvenile

victim's

testimony

in

a

rape

case.

Requiring the judge to hold a hearing in every case would seem
to

rather

defeat

the

purpose

of

the

law.

Moreover,

the

statute is quite narrow as construed by the Supreme Judicial
Court.

On

such

minimal

a

the

other

hand

restriction

it can
on

the

be

said--ironically--that

press

is

not

likely

to

provide the juvenile victim with any assurance of privacy and
thus does not serve any genuine state interest.

)~
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Justic

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-611

GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, APPELLANT v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MASSACHUSETTS
[May-, 1982]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 16A of Chapter 278 of Massachusetts General
Laws, 1 as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, requires trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the
press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that victim. The question presented is whether the
statute thus construed violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
The case began when appellant, Globe Newspaper Co.
(Globe), unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to a rape
trial conducted in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The criminal defendant in that trial had been charged with the forcible rape
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 16A (West), which provides in pertinent
part:
"At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or
other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the
person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, ... the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the
court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in
the case."
1

!A- , 1 • V

r
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and forced unnatural rape of three girls who were minors at
the time of trial-two sixteen years of age and one seventeen. In April1979, during hearings on several preliminary
motions, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed. 2 Before the trial began, Globe moved that the court revoke this
closure order, hold hearings on any future such orders, and
permit appellant to intervene "for the limited purpose of asserting its rights to access to the trial and hearings on related
preliminary motions." App. 12a-14a. The trial court denied Globe's motions, 3 relying on Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.
278, § 16A (West), and ordered the exclusion of the press and
general public from the courtroom during the trial. The defendant immediately objected to that exclusion order, and the
prosecution stated for purposes of the record that the order
was issued on the court's "own motion and not at the request
of the Commonwealth." App. 18a.
Within hours after the court had issued its exclusion order,
Globe sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 4 The next day the justice
conducted a hearing, at which the Commonwealth, "on behalf
of the victims," waived "whatever rights it [might] have
[had] to exclude the press." App. 28a. 5 Nevertheless,
2
"The court caused a sign marked 'closed' to be placed on the courtroom
door, and court personnel turned away people seeking entry." Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court , --Mass.--,--, 401 N.E. 2d 360,
362-363 (1980) (footnote omitted).
3
The court refused to permit Globe to file its motion to intervene and
explicitly stated that it would not act on Globe's other motions. App.
17a-18a.
4
Globe's request was contained in a petition for extraordinary relief filed
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 211, § 3 (West).
• The Commonwealth's representative stated:
"[O]ur position before the trial judge [was], and it is before this Court, that
in some circumstances a trial judge, where the defendant is asserting his
right to a constitutional, public trial, . .. may consider that as outweighing
the otherwise legitimate statutory interests, particularly where the Commonwealth [acts] on behalf of the victims, and this is literally on behalf of

81-611-0PINION
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Globe's request for relief was denied. Before Globe appealed to the full court, the rape trial proceeded and the defendant was acquitted.
Nine months after the conclusion of the criminal trial, the
Supreme Judicial Court issued its judgment, dismissing
Globe's appeal. Although the court held that the case was
rendered moot by completion of the trial, it nevertheless
stated that it would proceed to the merits, because the issues
raised by Globe were "significant and troublesome, and . . .
'capable of repetition yet evading review."' - - Mass.
- - , - - , 401 N.E. 2d 360, 362, quoting Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). As a statutory matter, the court agreed with Globe that § 16A did not
require the exclusion of the press from the entire criminal
trial. The provision was designed, the court determined, "to
encourage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward;
once they have come forward, the statute is designed to preserve their ability to testify by protecting them from undue
psychological harm at trial." --Mass., at--, 401 N.E.
2d, at 369. Relying on these twin purposes, the court conthe victims in the sense that they were consulted fully by the prosecutor in
this case. The Commonwealth waives whatever rights it may have to exclude the press." App. 28a.
Some time after the trial began, the prosecuting attorney informed the
judge at a lobby conference that she had "spoke[n] with each of the victims
regarding ... excluding the press." App. 48a. The prosecuting attorney
indicated that the victims had expressed some "privacy concerns" that
were based on "their own privacy interests, as well as the fact that there
are grandparents involved with a couple of these victims." Ibid. But according to the prosecuting attorney, the victims "wouldn't object to the
press being included" if "it were at all possible to obtain a guarantee" that
the press would not attempt to interview them or publish their names, photographs, or any personal information. Ibid. In fact, their names were
already part of the public record. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court,-- Mass.--,-, 423 N.E. 2d 773, 780 (1981). It is not clear
from the record, however, whether or not the victims were aware of this
fact at the time of their discussions with the prosecuting attorney.

81-611-0PINION
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eluded that § 16A required the closure of sex-offense trials
only during the testimony of minor victims; during other portions of such trials, closure was "a matter within the judge's
sound discretion." !d., a t -.- , 401 N.E. 2d, at 371. The
court did not pass on Globe's contentions that it had a right to
attend the entire criminal trial under the First and Sixth
Amendments, noting that it would await this Court's decision-then pending-in Richmond Newspapers , Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555 (1980). 6
Globe then appealed to this Court. Following our decision
in Richmond Newspapers, we vacated the judgment of the
Supreme Judicial Court, and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of that decision. 449 U. S. 894 (1980).
On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to its
earlier construction of § 16A, considered whether our decision in Richmond Newspapers required the invalidation of
the mandatory-closure rule of § 16A. - - Mass. - - , 423
N.E. 2d 773 (1981). 7 In analyzing the First Amendment
issue, 8 the court recognized that there is "an unbroken tradition of openness" in criminal trials. I d., at 778. But the
court discerned "at least one notable exception" to this tradi6
Justice Quirico dissented , being of the view that the mandatory-closure
rule of § 16A was not limited to the testimony of minor victims, but was
applicable to the entire trial.
7
The court again noted that the First Amendment issue arising from the
closure of the then-completed trial was "capable of repetition yet evading
review." --Mass., at--, n. 4, 423 N.E. 2d, at 775, n. 4, quoting
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). But in
contrast to the view it had taken in its prior opinion, supra, at 3, the court
held that the case was not moot because of this possibility of repetition
without opportunity for review.
8
The court found it unnecessary to consider Globe's argument that the
mandatory-closure rule violated the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminal defendant who had been acquitted in the rape trial. Those Sixth
Amendment rights, the court stated, were "personal rights" that, "at least
in the context of this case, [could] only be asserted by the original criminal
defendant." -Mass. , a t - , 423 N.E. 2d, at 776 (footnote omitted).

81-611-0PINION
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tion: "In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials
have been closed to some segments of the public, even.when
the victim was an adult." Ibid. The court also emphasized
that § 16A's mandatory-closure rule furthered "genuine State
interests," which the court had identified in its earlier decision as underlying the statutory provision. These interests,
the court stated, "would be defeated if a case-by-case determination were used." I d., at 779. While acknowleging that
the mandatory-closure requirement results in a "temporary
diminution" of the "the public's knowledge about these
trials," the court did not think "that Richmond Newspapers
require[d] the invalidation of the requirement, given the statute's narrow scope in an area of traditional sensitivity to the
needs of victims." I d., at 781. The court accordingly dismissed Globe's appeal. 9
Globe again sought review in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1981). For the reasons
that follow, we reverse, and hold that the mandatory-closure
rule contained in § 16A violates the First Amendment. 10
II
In this Court, Globe challenges that portion of the trial
court's order, approved by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, that holds that § 16A requires, under all circumstances, the exclusion of the press and general public
during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offense trial.
Because the entire order expired with the completion of the
rape trial at which the defendant was acquitted, we must consider at the outset whether a live controversy remains.
Justice Wilkins filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed concern whether a statute constitutionally could require closure "without specific findings by the judge that the closing is justified by overriding or
countervailing interests of the Commonwealth." Mass., at - , 423
N.E. 2d, at 782.
0
' We therefore have no occasion to consider Globe's additional argument
that the provision violates the Sixth Amendment.
9
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Under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, our jurisdiction extends only to actual cases or.controversies. Nebraska Press
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 546 (1976). "The Court has
recognized, however, that jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the
underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."' Ibid., quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911).
The controversy between the parties in this case is indeed
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." It can reasonably be assumed that Globe, as the publisher of a newspaper
serving the Boston metropolitan area, will someday be subjected to another order relying on§ 16A's mandatory-closure
rule. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368,
377-378 (1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U. S. 555, 563 (1980) (plurality opinion). And because criminal trials are typically of "short duration," ibid., such an
order will likely "evade review, or at least considered plenary
review in this Court." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart,
supra, at 547. We therefore conclude that the controversy
before us is not moot within the meaning of Art. III, and turn
to the merits.
III
A
The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers
firmly established for the first time that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that
case, seven Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. I d., at 558-581 (plurality opinion); id., at 584-598 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in
the judgment); id., at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment); id., at 601-604 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the
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judgment). 11
Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly mentioned in terms in the First Amendment. 12 But
we have long eschewed any "narrow, literal conception" of
the Amendment's terms, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430 (1963), for the Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a background of shared values and
practices. The First Amendment is thus broad enough to
encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights or are implicit in the very structure of self-government
established by the Constitution. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 579-580, and n. 16 (plurality
opinion) (citing cases); id., at 587-588, and n. 4 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring in the judgment). 13 Underlying the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common
understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,"
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). By offering
such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that
the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government. See
"JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of Rich·
mond Newspapers. But he had indicated previously in a concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979), that he viewed the
First Amendment as conferring on the press a right of access to criminal
trials. !d. , at 397-398.
12
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const. ,
Arndt. 1.
See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 30--38 (1978) (STEVENS,
J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 861-864
(1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
13
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Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1980); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 587-588 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). See also id., at 575
(plurality opinion) (the "expressly guaranteed freedoms" of
the First Amendment "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government"). Thus to the extent that the
First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal
trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one.
Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in
the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together
serve to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in
particular is properly afforded protection by the First
Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been
open to the press and general public. "[A]t the time when
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and
in England had long been presumptively open." Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 569 (plurality opinion). And since that time, the presumption of openness has
remained secure. Indeed, at the time of this Court's decision in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), the presumption
was so solidly grounded that the Court was "unable to find a
single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any
federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this
country." Id., at 266 (footnote omitted). This uniform rule
of openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional
terms not only "because the Constitution carries the gloss of
history," but also because "a tradition of accessibility implies
the favorable judgment of experience." Richmond N ewspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 589 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). 14
14

Appellee argues that criminal trials have not always been open to the
press and general public during the testimony of minor sex victims. Brief
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Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a
criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. 16 Moreover, public access
to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness,
thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. 16
And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials
permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
the judicial process-an essential component in our structure
of self-government. 17 In sum, the institutional value of the
for Appellee 13-22. Even if appellee is correct in this regard, but see
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368,423 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the argument is unavailing. In
Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general
matter criminal trials have long been presumptively open. Whether the
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be restricted in the
context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial (the setting
for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on
the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state
interests assertedly supporting the restriction. See Part III-B infra.
15
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc . v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 569 (plurality opinion); id., at 596-597 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment);
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979); id., at 428-429
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960); In re Oliver, 333
U. S. 257, 268-271 (1948); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U. S., at 570-571 (plurality opinion); id., at 595 (BRENNAN, J., concurring
in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc . v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 570-571
(plurality opinion); id., at 596 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment);
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., at 394 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER,
concurring); id., at 428 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

/~
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open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience.
B
Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 581, n. 18 (plurality opinion);
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 570. But the
circumstances under which the press and public can be
barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in denyjng access must be a wei ht one. Wlier"e, as in
the present case, the tate attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information,
it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored toserve
th~ g., Brown v. Hartlage, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U. S. 97, 101-103 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
438 (1963). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 580-581 (plurality opinion). 18 We now consider the state interests advanced to support Massachusetts'
mandatory. rule barring press and public access to criminal .
sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims.

IV
The state interests asserted to support § 16A, though articulated in various ways, are reducible to two: the protection of
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
18

Of course, limitations on the right of access that resemble "time, place,
and manner" restrictions on protected speech, see Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50, 63, n. 18 (1976), would not be subjected to
such strict scrutiny. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U. S., at 581-582, n. 18 (plurality opinion); id., at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id., at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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embarassment; and the encouragement of such victims to
come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. 19
We consider these interests in turn.
We agree with respondent that the first interest-safeguarding the physical and psychologreal well-being of a minor 20-is a compelling one. But as compelling as that interest is, i~a mandatory-closure rule, for it is
clear that t e circums ances of tlie partlcu ar case may affect
the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine
on a case-b -case basis whether c~o protect the welf
o a m or victim. 2 Among t e factors to be
weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity,
and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the
victim, 22 and the interests of parents and relatives. Section
19
In its opinion following our remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts described the interests in the following terms:
"(a) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute complaints and
give testimony ... ; (b) to protect minor victims of certain sex crimes from
public degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psychological damage
. .. ; (c) to enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors,
free of confusion, fright, or embellishment; (d) to promote the sound and
orderly administration of justice ... ; (e) to preserve evidence and obtain
just convictions." --Mass., at--, 423 N.E. 2d, at 779.
20
It is important to note that in the context of § 16A, the measure of the
State's interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by
testifying, but rather in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the
presence of the press and the general public.
21
Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that
individualized determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings,
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 448 U. S., at 581
(footnote omitted).
22
"[I]f the minor victim wanted the public to know precisely what a heinous crime the defendant had committed, the imputed legislative justifications for requiring the closing of the trial during the victim's testimony
would in part, at least, be inapplicable." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
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16A, in contrast, requires closure even if the victim does not
seek the exclusion of the press and general public, and would
not suffer injury by their presence. 23 In the case before us,
for example, the names of the minor victims were already in
the public record, 24 and the record indicates that the victims
may have been willing to testify despite the presence of the
press. 25 If the trial court had been permitted to exercise its
discretion, closure might well have been deemed unnecessary. In short, § 16A cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accommodating the State's asserted interest:
That interest could be served just as well by requiring the
trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the
State's legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the
constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to
criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary
rior Court, Mass. , - - , 423 N.E. 2d 773, 782 (Wilkins, J.,
concurring).
23
It appears that while other States have statutory or constitutional provisions that would allow a trial judge to close a criminal sex-offense trial
during the testimony of a minor victim, no other State has a mandatory
provision excluding both the press and general public during such testimony. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 12-21-202 (1975); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.3
(1973); Ga. Code § 81-1006 (1956 Rev.); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:469.1
(West 1981); Miss. Const., Art. 3, §26; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §632-A:8
(Supp. 1979); N.Y. J ud. Law § 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code§ 27-01-02 (1974); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-7-4 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 12, § 1901 (1973); Wis. Stat. § 970.03(4)
(Supp. 1981). See also Fla. Stat. § 918.16 (Supp. 1982) (providing for mandatory exclusion of general public but not press during testimony of minor
victims). Of course, we intimate no view regarding the constitutionality
of these state statutes.
24
The Court has held that the government may not impose sanctions for
the publication of the names of rape victims lawfully obtained from the public record. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975). See
also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97 (1979).
u See supra, at 2-3, and n. 5.

{
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to protect the State's interest. 26
Nor can § 16A be justified on the basis of the Commonwealth's S£COnd asserted interest-the encouragement of
minor victims of sex crimes tocome forward and provide accurate testimony. The Commonwealth has offered no empirical sup~ort for the claim that the rule of automatic closure
contained m § 16A will lead to an increase in the number of
minor sex victims coming forward and cooperating with state
authorities. '1:1 . Not only is the claim speculative in empirical
terms, but it is also open to serious question' as a matter of
logic and common sense. Although§ 16A bars the press and
general public from the courtroom during the testimony of (
minor sex victims, the press is not denied access to the transcript, court personnel, or any other possible source that
could provide an account of the minor victim's testimony.
_
26

Of course, for a case-by-case approach to be meaningful, represent- \
atives of the press and general public "must be given an opportunity to be
heard on the question of their exclusion." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S. 368, 401 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This does not mean, however, that for purposes of this inquiry the court cannot protect the minor
victim by denying these representatives the opportunity to confront or
cross-examine the victim, or by denying them access to sensitive details
concerning the victim and the victim's future testimony. Such discretion
is consistent with the traditional authority of trial judges to conduct in camera conferences. SeeRichmondNewspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.,
at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). Without such
trial court discretion, a State's interest in safeguarding the welfare of the
minor victim, determined in an individual case to merit some form of closure, would be defeated before it could ever be brought to bear.
'i:1 To the extent that it is suggested that, quite apart from encouraging
minor victims to testify, § 16A improves the quality and credibility of testimony, the suggestion also is speculative. And while closure may have
such an effect in particular cases, the Court has recognized that, as a general matter, "[o}penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of
testimony." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) (emphasis added). In the absence of any showing that closure would improve
the quality of testimony of all minor sex victims, the State's interest certainly cannot justify a mandatory-closure rule.

Vtn/
O
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Thus § 16A cannot prevent the press from publicizing the
substance of a minor victim's testimony, as well as his or her
identity. If the Commonwealth's interest in encouraging minor victims to come forward depends on keeping such matters secret, § 16A hardly advances that interest in an effective manner. And even if § 16A effectively advanced the
State's interest, it is doubtful that the interest would be sufficient to overcome the constitutional attack, for that same interest could be relied on to support an array of mandatoryclosure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward:
Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex
crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity
attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward
and testify. The State's argument based on this interest
therefore proves too much, and runs contrary to the very
foundation of the right of access recognized in Richmond
Newspapers: namely, "that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system
of justice." 448 U. S., at 573 (plurality opinion).

v
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 16A, as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. 28 Accordingly, the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court is
Reversed.
28
We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is constitutionally infirm. In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the
First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from
the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.
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